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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, educators, politicians and citizens have become
increasingly aware of student discipline problems in schools.'
Schoolteachers and administrators often find it difficult to deal effectively
with these discipline problems.
The difficulty stems in part from
students' and parents' threats of legal actions.3 As one teacher stated, "We
have empowered parents to such a degree that the administration quakes
at the thought of a parent coming in. So to avoid possible conflict,
whatever the parent wants goes. "4
Students and parents bring a variety of legal claims against school
officials. The claims sound in tort or contract theories such as fraud,
misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty, or due process or statutory
violations. 5 One example of a claim is "educational malpractice, " 6 a
specific tort alleging that an educational institution failed to meet
acceptable educational standards.7 Student dissatisfaction claims may be
made against public primary schools, public secondary schools, private
primary schools, or private secondary, trade or graduate schools.!
Part II of this case note will provide a general discussion of two
recent Minnesota Court of Appeals cases, Zeliman v. Independent School
District No. 2 75 8' and Alsides v. Brown Institute, Ltd.,' ° involving student
dissatisfaction claims and how these cases relate to modem educational

1. See, e.g., Margaret Carlson, No More Teachers' Silly Rules, TIME, Oct. 21,
1996, at 27; Class, Come to Order!, THE EDuc. DIG., Jan. 1996, at 24; John W.
Donohue, Brandishingthe Rod, AM.,Jan. 13, 1996, at 4; Edna Varner, Make Discipline
Problems Improve Instruction, THE EDUC. DIG., Sept. 1999, at 18; Stephen Wallis,
Disciplineand Civility Must Be Restored To America's Public Schools, USA TODAY, Nov.
1995, at 32;Jeanne Wright, Discipline and Order in the Classroom, CURRENT, July-Aug.
1997, at 23; 20/20, Feel Good About Failure(ABC television broadcast, Aug. 1, 1999),
available at <http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/20.. .ipts/2020_990801_esteem_trans.html> [hereinafter 20/20].
2. See, e.g., Wright, supranote 1, at 25.
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. See Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating
EducationalLiability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1768, 1775-84 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Cencor,
Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1994); B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont.
1982).
7. See McJessy, supra note 5, at 1769.
8. See, e.g., Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); VanLoock v. Curran, 489 So. 2d 525
(Ala. 1986); Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1994).
9. 594 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Minn. July 28,
1999).
10. 592 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/8

2

2000]

Emerson:
School Law—Ejecting
DisgruntledSTUDENTS'
Students' Claims:
A Modern Educat 841
REJECTING
DISGRUNTLED
CLAIMS

theory regarding discipline. A discussion of the historical significance of
student dissatisfaction will follow in Part III, including a discussion of how
federal courts and courts of other jurisdictions have treated the issue and
past legal treatment in Minnesota. Part IV will further describe the court's
decisions and its reasoning in Zellman and Alsides. Finally, this case note
will analyze those decisions, including future implications and the
decisions' effect on modern psychological theory in the school system.
II. ZELLMANAND ALSIDES: HOW THE CASES RELATE TO MODERN
EDUCATIONAL THEORY
In deciding Zellman and Alsides the Minnesota Court of Appeals
reviewed certain pivotal student dissatisfaction issues for the first time.
Ze!/man involved a public high school student who was disgruntled with
the school district for taking disciplinary action against him." The student
received a grade of "zero" on a history project because he plagiarized in
part from a reference book. 2 The school's action was in accordance with
school policy."
The school board affirmed the grade after an
investigation, principal's review, a hearing before the school board and
the school district board's review. 4 The student brought suit, claiming
breach of contract and a due process violation.'5 After reviewing the
claim, the court of appeals affirmed the school district board's decision.' 6
Alsides concerned a different student dissatisfaction issue. The claim
was made against a secondary trade school. 7 Students were disgruntled
with the poor quality of their education.' 8 The students sued for "fraud,
misrepresentation, breach of contract, consumer fraud, and deceptive
trade practices."' 9 The district court dismissed the claims under summary
judgment.20 The court rejected the claims because the claims sounded in
educational malpractice and violated public policy.2 1 In addition, the trial
court held that the Consumer Fraud Act22 and Uniform Deceptive Trade

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Zellman, 594 N.W.2d at 219.
See id. at 218.
See id.
See id. at 219.
See id. at 218.
See id. at 222.
See Alsides, 592 N.W.2d at 470.
See id. at 471.
Id.
See id.
See id.
MINN. STAT. § 325F.69, subd. 1 (1998).
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Practices Act22 do not apply to education.24
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
rejection of educational malpractice claims. 25 However, it carved a narrow
exception permitting specific claims of breach of contract, fraud and
misrepresentation that do not entail "an 'inquiry into the nuances of
educational processes and theories.'"2 6 In addition, in reversing the
district court, the appellate court held that the Minnesota Consumer
Fraud Act and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act might apply to
education. 7
Numerous jurisdictions have addressed such student dissatisfaction
Most jurisdictions largely have rejected the claims based on
issues.28
various public policy reasons.n For example, many courts are reluctant to
become involved in reviewing educational policies, goals, disciplinary
decisions and procedures.' ° Courts claim that these issues depend upon
numerous factors and thus are difficult to determine fairly. 31 In addition,
many courts believe that professional educators and school boards are in
the best position to establish and enforce policies. 2
Despite the strong public policy arguments the courts set forth,
commentators have criticized their decisions not to intervene. 3 Generally,

23. Id. § 325D.43 (1998).
24. SeeAlsides, 592 N.W.2d at 471.
25. See id. at 476.
26. Id. at 473 (citing Ryan v. University of N.C. Hosps., 494 S.E.2d 789, 791
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998)).
27. See id. at 476.
28. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992); Peter W. v.
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Cencor,
Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1994); B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont.
1982); Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
29. See Alsides, 592 N.W.2d at 472.
30. See id.
31. See id. (noting that educational malpractice claims should be rejected for
several reasons: (1) difficulty in ascertaining a standard of care for educators; (2)
uncertainty about causation and the amount of damages; (3) the possibility of a
flood of litigation against schools; (4) the impropriety of the court system
overseeing the daily activities of school).
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., Catherine D. McBride, EducationalMalpractice:JudicialRecognition
of a Limited Duty of Educators Toward Individual Students; A State Law Cause of Action
for EducationalMalpractice,1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 475, 476 (1990) (advocating limited
claims against school officials to assure that they correctly implement their own
policies); McJessy, supra note 5, at 1769 (arguing that schools should be held
legally accountable for their actions for two reasons: first, students are "consumers
of education" and thus should have input into its activities, and second, concern
that schools are failing to properly educate children).
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this criticism is part of a long-established student rights movement.34
Parents are more involved than ever in assuring that school officials do
not discipline children and that children receive a valuable education. 5
In reaction to this student rights movement, one modern
psychological theory supposes that the lack of discipline arising from fear
of parental complaints hurts students' education.3 This lack of discipline
results in overly confident, disrespectful children who hinder the learning
process for themselves and other students.37 Because administrators fear
parental complaints, teachers receive little administrative support and
cannot effectively perform their jobs or control their classrooms.-

34. See generally Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Administration of Coiporal
Punishment in Public School System as Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under Eighth
Amendment, 25 A.L.R. FED. 431, 434-35 (1998) (prompting attorneys to keep
current with the continuing developments in students' rights laws). See also
Carlson, supra note 1, at 27 (pointing out how involved parents have become in
assuring that teachers do not discipline children); Wallis, supra note 1, at 32
(describing the "erosion" of student discipline and academic culture over time).
35. See generally Carlson, supra note 1, at 27 (stating that parents no longer
give teachers "the benefit of the doubt in ilisciplinary matters," but now challenge
"them on the grounds that little Johnny is perfect and any blot on his transcript
will keep him out of Harvard"); Wright, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing two
situations: one where a mother was furious that her son had to do push-ups in class
for misbehaving, and another where a mother complained that her son was
excluded from a class party for misbehaving).
36. See Wright, supra note 1, at 23-25 (pointing out that even if most children
in a class are cooperative and eager to learn, one disruptive student can hinder the
learning process for the entire class).
37. See id. at 25. Many educators are concerned that schools focus too much
on promoting children's self-esteem at the expense of learning. See id. "[S]o
much emphasis has been put on promoting students' self-esteem that educators
are afraid to discipline or demand good behavior from kids because they'll be
accused of hurting their self-esteem. 'We're raising a generation of ill-behaved,
rude kids... but, by God, they feel great.'" Id. (quoting high school teacher
Deborah Sanville); see also Wallis, supra note 1, at 33 ("[T]he notion of 'selfesteem' as a sunny, 'feel-good' exercise is undermining real education, selfdiscipline, and achievement. It is largely false and obscures the need for students
to work hard, demonstrating perseverance and understanding honesty,
responsibility, opportunity, and possibilities, to achieve success."); 20/20, supra
note 1 (discussing studies that show that violence may be the result of artificially
high self-esteem, and noting one study showing that prisoners as a group have a
much higher self esteem than college students).
38. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 27; Donahue, supra note 1, at 4
(discussing new "teacher immunity" laws in Alabama and Virginia that will assure
administration back-up if a teacher is "hailed to court by an indignant parent");
Wallis, supra note 1, at 33; Wright, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that teachers are
"isolated and frustrated").
But see Wright, supra note 1, at 24 (noting
administrative accusations that teachers exaggerate discipline problems, and that
some educators merely blame administration because they do not want to initiate
discipline on their own).
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Student dissatisfaction claims play an important role in this struggle.
Courts that refuse to interfere with school boards' and officials' actions
and decisions allow such officials to make fair decisions based on
professional experience without answering or explaining to a higher
authority. As a result, school officials can better support decisions of the
teaching staff in educating and disciplining students.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals decisions in Zelman and Alsides
support this modern psychological theory by rejecting student
dissatisfaction claims.3 9 In both cases, the court refused to engage in
educational disputes.4 However, the court then balanced this refusal by
properly permitting
interference only in cases of schools' extremely
4
1
conduct.
egregious
III. HISTORY
A.

Historical Common Law
1.

Discipline

Historical discussion relating to court treatment of school discipline
generally pertains to discipline in public schools rather than private
schools.
The analysis pertaining to the two types of schools are
distinguishable because public schools are state entities. State law creates
the schools and state and local authorities administer the schools,4 2 thus
implicating the U.S. Constitution. 4
State and federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 4
generally extend deference to educators' academic assessments as a vital
element of academic freedom.45 Courts often are reluctant to interfere
39. See supra notes 16 and 25 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 16 and 25 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 160-62, 177 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment states "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Id.
44. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Regent of
the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Board of Educ. v. McCluskey, 458
U.S. 966 (1982); Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 US. 308 (1975); Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237
U.S. 589 (1915). But see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (affirming a finding
of due process violation and permitting students nominal damages for their
complaint); Goss, 419 U.S. at 565 (affirming the district court's finding that a
suspension for ten days with no hearing violated the students' due process rights).
45. See Thomas A. Schweitzer, "Academic Challenge" Cases:Should JudicialReview
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/8
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with the professional judgment of school officials and administrators.
Courts, however, show greater willingness to review disciplinary actions
when discipline relates to behavioral misconduct rather than poor
academic performance.
The courts analyze due process complaints under a well-established
framework.4' The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the state from
depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.49 A citizen has a protected property interest as long as it is provided
by "state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits"

50

or by a

contract between parties." A liberty interest is implicated where "a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him or her."52
When a property or liberty interest is at stake, the school must satisfy
due process requirements and, at a minimum, provide the student with
notice and an opportunity to be heard.53 This procedure assures a fair
factual determination based on both sides of the story.4 The type of
notice and hearing depends on the circumstances of the case.5 5 For
example, extreme conduct may call for immediate action to protect other
children at school.u In general, however, a hearing should precede

Extend to Academic Evaluations of Students, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 267, 271-72 (1992).
46. See id. at 272.

47.

See generally Ewing, 474 U.S. at 224-25 (finding no arbitrary state action in

dismissing a student from a university undergraduate/medical program); Horowitz,
435 U.S. at 90 (stating that a hearing is not necessary to satisfy due process in cases
of academic dismissal); Waugh, 237 U.S. at 591 (finding no constitutional violation
in prohibiting fraternities at state institutions); Schweitzer, supra note 45, at 304-06
(discussing the holding in Horowitz, including Justice Marshall's dissent). But see
Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion
"in its assumption that characterization of the reasons for a dismissal as 'academic'
or 'disciplinary' is relevant to resolution of the question of what procedures are
required by the Due Process Clause").
48. See infra notes 49-81 and accompanying text.
49. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975).
51. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 223 (citation omitted) (stating that agreements
implied from "the promisor's words and conduct in the light of the surrounding
circumstances," could be independent sources of property interests); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (stating one must have more than a
unilateral expectation of a property right).
52. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
53. See id. at 579-81 (holding that a ten-day suspension or less from school
required oral or written notice of the charges against the student, an explanation
of the evidence against him, and a chance to present his side of the story).
54. See id. at 580.
55. See id. at 579.

56.

See id. at 580, 582-83 ("Students whose presence poses a continuing
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dismissal.57 Courts have established broad guidelines for the hearing. For
example, students have no right to counsel at the hearing, no right to call
witnesses, nor any right to confront and cross-examine witnesses."
In contrast to discipline cases, academic dismissal cases, such as those
based on poor grade performance, impose fewer procedural due process
requirements. 9 The U.S. Supreme Court formally acknowledged this
position in 1978, holding that academic dismissal did not require a
hearing. 6" In that case, a medical student was dismissed for failing to meet
certain academic standards.6' School officials continually informed the
student of "faculty dissatisfaction" with her academic performance. 62
Officials also permitted an examination of the student by seven physicians
to assure proper grading. 63 The court held that these procedures were
sufficient to fulfill due process requirements." Since this opinion, other
courts have followed suit in imposing less procedural due process
65
requirements in academic dismissal cases.
Many school actions implicate property or liberty interests. 66 If state
law provides a right to public education and a student is suspended from
school, he or she may have been deprived of a property interest in his or
her education.67 Courts have been less willing to find a property interest

danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic
process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary
notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable.").
57.

See id.

58. See id. at 583 (holding that such measures would be more costly than
effective and could destroy the value of discipline in the education system).
59. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
60. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (reasoning that
the "educational process is not by nature adversary; instead it centers around a
continuing relationship between faculty and students;" thus, holding it could be
damaging to the process to require a hearing in situations of poor academic
achievement).
61.
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 79.
See id. at 85.
See id.
See id.

65. See, e.g., Lewin v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, 910 F. Supp. 1161,
1164-65 (E.D. Va. 1996).
66. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
67.

See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975)

(stating that whether a

property interest has been implicated depends on the time of suspension and
holding that suspension for ten days or more requires due process procedures); see
also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (holding that a
two-day suspension does not call for extensive due process protections); Zehner v.
Central Berkshire Reg'l Sch. Dist., 921 F.Supp. 850, 858 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding
that a three-day suspension required due process).
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when a student has not been suspended or expelled from school.6 For
example, "a student's interest in taking part in interscholastic athletics
only 'amounts to a mere expectation rather than a constitutionally
protected claim of entitlement.'"6
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that school suspension for a
period of ten days or longer "could seriously damage the students'
standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere
with later opportunities for higher education and employment." 7 The
damage to reputation in those situations may implicate a liberty interest as
well as a property interest.
In addition to procedural due process rights, students also may be
Procedural due process
entitled to substantive due process rights.'
merely guarantees a "fair decision-making process" before the
government takes away an individual's life, liberty or property.7 2 In
contrast, substantive due process protects "against the use of arbitrary
rules of law which are the basis of those proceedings," thus dealing with
the substance of the underlying law.73
When a student is suspended from public school, the suspension
violates substantive due process only if "the right affected is 'implicit in
In C.B. v. Driscoll 75 school
the concept of ordered liberty.'" 74
administrators suspended a student for fighting, shouting obscenities and
injuring administrators. 76 The court rejected the student's substantive due
process claim, saying there is no fundamental right to attend school and,
thus, no substantive violation from a suspension.77
Substantive due process primarily arises in academic dismissal cases.78
68. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
69. Zehner, 921 F. Supp. at 862 (citing Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 159 (5th Cir. 1980)).
70. Goss, 419 U.S. at 575.
71. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91 (1978).
72. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 14.6 (3d. ed. 1999).

73. See id.
74. C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 387 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
75. 82 F.3d 383 (llth Cir. 1996).
76.
77.

See id. at 385.
See id. at 387.

78. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1985); Board
of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91 (1978); Lewin v. Medical College of
Hampton Roads, 910 F. Supp. 1161, 1167 (E.D. Va. 1996). But see Ewing,474 U.S.
at 229 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the majority opinion incorrectly
confuses substantive due process with procedural due process, and opining that an
interest in continued enrollment is not a fundamental interest protected by
substantive due process from the Constitution).
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Courts generally hold that academic dismissal from a public school may
" 79
violate substantive due process if it is "clearly arbitrary or capricious.
However, in Board of Curators v. Horowitz,80 the U.S. Supreme Court alluded
to its distaste for such claims, noting its difficulty in reviewing an academic
decision under this standard."

2. EducationalMalpractice
Educational malpractice claims first arose in the 1970s, when the
public became increasingly critical of education.82
Educational
malpractice entails two types of claims: (1) failure to properly educate;
and (2) improper evaluation and placement.
Although courts
distinguish between the two claims,84 the analysis and outcome usually is
the same. 5
Despite persistent attempts to hold schools liable for educational
malpractice, courts generally resist such claims.8
In fact, one
commentator summarizes educational malpractice as a theory "beloved of

79. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91 (citing Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448,
449 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also Lewin, 910 F. Supp. at 1167 (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S.
at 225 and holding that where challenged action rests on academic decision, that
decision should be upheld unless "it is such a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms as to demonstrate that the person did not actually exercise
professional judgment").
80. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
81. See id.at 91.
82. See Thomas G. Eschweiler, EducationalMalpracticein Sex Education,49 SMU
L. REv. 101, 102 (1995) (explaining that courts were loathe to impose liability on
educational institutions due to public policy considerations).
83. See id.
84. See McBride, supra note 33, at 476.
85. See id. at 479; see also Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting, on public policy grounds, plaintiffs
claim for failure to properly provide basic academic skills); Torres v. Little Flower
Children's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223, 226-27 (N.Y. 1984) (rejecting plaintiffs claim for
improperly testing plaintiff as mentally retarded because of the plaintiffs inability
to speak English); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 318 (N.Y. 1979)
(rejecting plaintiff's claim for educational malpractice where plaintiff was initially
tested as being mentally retarded and was thereafter placed in a school for the
retarded, even though a recommended test two years after the initial test would
have revealed that plaintiff was not retarded); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free
Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (N.Y. 1979) (rejecting plaintiffs claim for failure
to provide a basic education).
86. See Eschweiler, supra note 82, at 102. But see B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425
(Mont. 1982) (holding that school authorities do owe a duty of reasonable care to
individual students in testing and placing them in appropriate educational
programs).
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commentators, but not of courts."
Educational malpractice claims generally are premised on a
traditional negligence theory." The necessary elements for this claim are
an existing legal duty, breach of that duty, a resulting injury, and
proximate cause between the breach and the resulting injury. s9 Many
claims are dismissed for lack of a legal duty from instructors to students. 9°
Students have asserted that a legal duty arises when a teacher accepts his
or her role as an educator, or as a result of the "'special relationship
between students and teachers which supports [the teachers'] duty to
exercise reasonable care.'" 91 At least one court held that a legal duty of
care requires balancing several factors including the following:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
to the defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for
breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved.u
In addition to finding a legal duty, courts also have difficulty finding
proximate cause.93 This difficulty arises from the inability of courts to
determine the impact that factors outside the classroom have on the
94
educational process.
Plaintiffs also have trouble identifying and
quantifying specific damages.95
87.

Eschweiler, supra note 82, at 102.

88.
89.

See id. at 107.
See id.

90. See id. While some courts simply find that educators have no legal duty to
educate, others may find that the duty is owed to the public, not to the individual
student because the primary purpose of education is to benefit the public. See
McBride, supranote 33, at 475.
91. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 858
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citing cases which enforced rights, opportunities or privileges
of public students, but did not involve the specific question regarding duty of
care).
92. Id. at 859-60 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal.
1968)).
93. See Eschweiler, supra note 82, at 108.
94. See id. at 109 (noting possible outside factors such as the physical,
emotional, or neurological make-up of the student; and the cultural and social
environment in which the student resides).
95. See id. at 110 (discussing traditional tort doctrine regarding quantifying
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While negligence is the primary theory for educational malpractice,
such claims also may be based on substantive due process, contract and
misrepresentation. 9
As with negligence claims, however, most are
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 7
For example,
constitutional claims have been unsuccessful because no express or
implied right exists to an education under the Constitution. 9 Claims for
negligent misrepresentation generally are treated the same as claims for
negligence.99
Alternatively, some courts recognize a legitimate cause of action but
dismiss the claim for public policy reasons.' °
These public policy
considerations may include: "(1) judicial intrusion into the educational
process; (2) the social utility of education; (3) the student-teacher
relationship; and (4) the economic and administrative impact upon
schools." 01' Rather than specifically dismiss the claim on public policy
grounds, many courts reason that public policy inhibits finding a duty of

damages).
96. See id. at 102.
97. See id. at 110 (noting the difficulty in establishing three of the essential
components to a tort claim).
98. See McJessy, supra note 5, at 1781-82.
99. See id. at 1778 (noting, however, that claims for intentional
misrepresentation may succeed while negligence alone may not).
100. See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354
(N.Y. 1979) (reasoning that "[t]o entertain a cause of action for 'educational
malpractice' would require the courts not merely to make judgments as to the
validity of broad educational policies.., but, more importantly, to sit in review of
the day-to-day implementation of these policies.").
101. Eschweiler, supra note 82, at 111. Judicial intrusion requires the court to
substitute its judgment for that of professional educators. See id. at 112. The social
utility of education factor indicates that a problem exists when a student has not
been adequately taught. See id. at 113. The student-teacher relationship factor
means that there is unequal power between the educator and student and thus,
judicial intervention may be necessary in some circumstances. See id. at 114.
Finally, the economic and administrative impact factor requires the court to
consider schools' possible exposure to false claims, and the financial burden of
such claims. See id. at 113. As one court states:
the court would be engaged in a comprehensive review of a myriad of
educational and pedagogical factors, as well as administrative policies
that enter into the consideration of whether the method of instruction
and choice of textbook was appropriate, or preferable.... Such inquiry
would constitute a clear "judicial displacement of complex educational
determinations" that is best left to the educational community.
Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (quoting
Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
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102

B.

HistoricalTreatment in Minnesota
1.

Discipline

Due process analysis of alleged unfair disciplinary action generally
includes U.S. Supreme Court precedent.'0 3 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, relying on Goss v. Lopez, °'0 dealt directly with the issue in Abbariao v.
Hamline University School of Law.'02

The plaintiff was a third-year law

student at Hamline when he was expelled for failing to maintain a
minimum grade point average.' °6 He sought an injunction preventing the
school from expelling him, claiming in part that the expulsion violated his
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 7
For purposes of the appeal, the court assumed that Hamline
University was a "state" entity and thus subject to constitutional
restrictions.'02 The supreme court confirmed that a student's interest in
attending a public college or university is a property interest requiring
due process compliance.'0 9 Citing Goss, the court stated that the requisite
procedural protections depended on balancing the student's interests and
needs and the university's interests and resources."0 The court then
acknowledged the difference between discipline relating to student
misconduct and discipline relating to academic deficiency."' The court2
held that a hearing is necessary only in cases of student misconduct."
However, in cases of academic deficiency, "if a student's expulsion results
from the arbitrary, capricious, or bad-faith actions of university officials,
the judiciary will intervene and direct the university to treat the student
102.
103.
of Mo.
104.

See McBride, supra note 33, at 475-76.
See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Board of Curators of Univ.
v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).

105. 258 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1977).
106. See id. at 110. The student had a cumulative grade point average of 1.79
on a 4.0 scale after two and a half years as a student. See id.
107. See id. at 111. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs claim for failure
to state a cause of action. See id.
108. See id. at 111-12 (assuming sufficient state action because the complaint
was dismissed for failure to state a claim).
109. See id. at 112 (questioning what procedural protections are afforded to
the plaintiff given the specific facts).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. (noting that a hearing is only necessary here to ensure fair
factfinding, unlike cases of academic deficiency where a student's exams and
grades are the only relevant facts).
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fairly."
Plaintiff claimed that school officials acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by singling out his exams for grading and that the grading
was biased because school officials knew that he was on probation.14 The
court held that the plaintiff stated a valid claim for relief."
In addition to recognizing a due process claim against public
universities, the court in Abbariao also confirmed a common law claim
against private universities.1 6 The common law analysis pertaining to
Thus, in
academic discipline parallels the due process analysis."'
Minnesota, students at private universities also are protected against
university officials' arbitrary, capricious and bad-faith actions.'
A third type of protection in disciplinary situations recognized in
Abbariaois contractual protection." 9 The court held that contract law does
apply to student-university relationships but is not rigidly applied.'2
Another Minnesota Supreme Court case addressed not a public
school's disciplinary action, but school restrictions on extracurricular
hockey activities. 21 Without invoking a constitutional analysis in reviewing
public school rules, the court limited itself to intervention only when
school action was arbitrary and capricious.' 22 The court stated that
substituting its judgment for that of school officials "would result in
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 113.
116. See id. at 112-13 (noting that such common law claim was originally
recognized in Gleason v. University of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650
(1908)).
117. Seeid.at 113.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. (holding that Hamline University was not bound by a bulletin
posted three years before by a law school then not affiliated with Hamline
University).
121. See Brown v. Wells, 288 Minn. 468, 475, 181 N.W.2d 708, 712 (1970)
(reviewing school rules preventing participation in League hockey tournaments if
a student also plays for an independent hockey team or attends an outside hockey
camp or clinic).
122. See id. at 710-11. The court stated:
[T]he court must determine if the board's action is so willful and
unreasoning, without consideration of the facts and circumstances, and
in such disregard of them as to be arbitrary and capricious. Where there
is room for two opinions on the matter, such action is not "arbitrary and
capricious," even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion
has been reached.
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confusion detrimental to the management, progress, and efficient
operation of our public school system."'23 The hockey eligibility rule was
not clearly wrong, and thus the court refused to intervene.
2.

EducationalMalpractice

Minnesota
claims.

has little history regarding educational

malpractice

In fact, only Vilett v. Moler,125 decided by the Minnesota Supreme

Court in 1900, is even remotely related. In Vilett, the plaintiff brought
claims against the defendant barber school for false and fraudulent
representations.12 6 The trial court permitted the case to be sent to the
jury.'

7

The supreme court held that a claim was actionable if the school

to deceive and the parties had unequal
made a false statement with intent
2
knowledge of the relevant facts. 1
IV. THE ZELLMANDECISION
A.

The Facts

M.Z. was enrolled in an American history course at a public high
school in defendant's district during the 1997-98 school year. 29 At the
beginning of the school year, school officials distributed a copy of the
student handbook to students including M.Z. 3" The handbook2 described
plagiarism' and pronounced a grade of zero for a first offense.
At the beginning of spring semester, M.Z.'s history teacher
distributed behavioral guidelines to her students.' 3" M.Z. signed a copy of

123.

Id. at 711.

124.

See id.

125. 82 Minn. 12, 84 N.W. 452 (1900).
126. See id. at 452. The plaintiff responded to an advertisement requesting
males to attend its barber school. See id. at 453. The advertisement stated "$60
monthly guarantied after eight weeks' practice. Can place 500 graduates on
palace trains, hospitals, or city shops at once.... We guarantee $15 weekly after
two months' practice .... " Id. Plaintiff paid the $50 tuition. See id. However, after
eight weeks instruction, plaintiff had not learned the trade and was refused
further instruction. See id.
127.
128.

See id. at 453.
See id. at 454.

129. See Zellman v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 2758, 594 N.W.2d 216, 218
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, (Minn. July 28, 1999).
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 218.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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these guidelines.)'
The guidelines specifically stated, "that a violation
could result in 'nullification of any/all points for [the] assignment in
question.'"" 5 As part of the history course, students were required to
complete a final project.'M M.Z.'s final project consisted of explaining "in
his 'own words and perspective.., the events which took place' during a
particular decade."
Upon receiving the assignment, M.Z. joked, "about
photocopying pages of a book, stapling the copies, and turning it in." s
His history teacher overheard this statement and reiterated the
implications of plagiarism." 9
Despite these warnings, M.Z. and three additional students turned in
final papers with large portions copied word for word from reference
books.' 4° After discussing the situation with the students and their parents,
the teacher gave the students zero grades on their projects.'
Clearly dissatisfied with this punishment, M.Z. and his parents
discussed the matter again with his teacher and principal. 42 After 4a3
second meeting with the parents, the principal affirmed the grade.
Upon appeal to the school superintendent, a hearing was held and M.Z.
and his parents attended.'44
The superintendent conducted an
investigation, interviewing the teacher and five classmates. 45 The
superintendent then affirmed the grade.'4
Upon appeal in a closed meeting, the school district board affirmed
the grade. '4
M.Z.'s parents then filed a writ of certiorari with the
Minnesota Court of Appeals to review the due process issues involved in
the matter.'14 M.Z. raised several claims including breach of contract and
denial of procedural and substantive due process.149

134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. (stating the teacher informed the students specifically that the
assignments must be written in the students' own words).
140. See id. at 218-19.
141. See id. at 219.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. (stating that M.Z. argued that the student handbook formed a
unilateral contract between him and the school, entitling him to continued
education and apparently, a passing grade for the project).
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss3/8
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B.

The Court's Analysis

The Minnesota Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the school
board's decision.' 50 As to the contract claim, the court stated, "that a
student handbook provided by a public school district does not form a
unilateral contract between the student and the school district."1 51
The court also held that M.Z.'s right to due process was not infringed
because he had no constitutionally protected property or liberty
interest. 152 A protected property interest can arise only from "an
independent source " 53 such as a state statute or a contract.'5 While
entitlement to a public education is a protected property interest under
state law,' 55 the court held that M.Z. was not denied a public education.
Instead, he was given a zero grade. 57 This grade did not implicate a state
law or contract, and thus did not give rise to a protected property
interest. '
Also, the injury to M.Z.'s academic reputation did not
implicate a protected liberty interest. 59
Finally, even if M.Z. did have a protected property or liberty interest,
he received both procedural and substantive due process.'60 "Due process
requires that a student receive oral or written notice of the charges and a
hearing at which the student has an opportunity to present 'his side of the
story.'" 18 ' The court found that M.Z. received several opportunities to tell

150.

See id. at 222.

151.

Id. at 220. The court justified this holding on two grounds. See id. at 219.

First, it denied the claim on public policy grounds, maintaining that public

education is the product of public desire for free education and not a contractual
arrangement. See id. Second, the court addressed lack of consideration. See id. It
held that unlike an employment situation or attendance at a tuition-charging
school, the school receives no benefit from the student's attendance. See id.
Rather, "[t] he state benefits from the education of its citizens and students benefit
from their own educational success." Id.
152. See id. at 220 (pointing out that a successful due process claim requires a
showing that the school deprived him of a property or liberty interest).
153. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)).
154.

See id.

155. See MINN. STAT. § 120A.20 (1998) (requiring public schools to provide a
free education to students living within their districts).
156. See Zellman, 594 N.W.2d at 220.
157.
158.
159.

See id.
See id.
See id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), and noting that "an

injury to 'reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as
employment' does not involve a liberty interest").

160. See id. at 221-22 (stating that the school provided M.Z. with substantial
due process and its decision was fair and reasonable).
161. Id. at 221 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)).
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S •• 162
his side of the story to school authorities and admitted to plagianzing.
Finally, the court stated that substantive due process requires a
determination of whether the board's decision was arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable.
The court confirmed that the board "acted in an
eminently fair and reasonable manner. " 6

V. THE ALSIDES DECISION

A.

The Facts

Four students were enrolled at the defendant Brown Institute, Ltd.
(Brown), a for-profit, proprietary trade school.'6
The students
participated in a twelve-month Personal Computer/Local Area Network
I
program at Brown in response to promotions the school set forth.'
These promotions indicated that graduating students would be prepared
to work as "PC installers and repairers and LAN installers, support
technicians, and administrators," and eventually become Certified
Network Administrators (CNA)

167

Dissatisfied with the actual education they received, the students
brought several claims against Brown."" They alleged that Brown
committed fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, consumer fraud
(in violation of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act) and deceptive trade
practices (in violation of Minnesota's Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act).169
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims under summary
judgment.' 7
The district court stated that the claims sounded in
162.
163.

See id.
See id.

164. Id. at 221-22 (noting that students were told prior to beginning the
project that copying text information would be considered plagiarism and result
in a zero grade).
165. See Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (stating that the cost of tuition paid by the plaintiffs ranged from $8,385 to
$10,127).
166. See id. (stating promotions included newspaper ads, a brochure, and a
radio advertisement).
167. Id. One brochure specifically stated that "students would (1) learn
'today's most popular desktop systems;' (2) work with the most powerful computer
chips on the market, including Pentiums, 486 PCs, Powermacs, and file servers;
and (3) be prepared to take two industry-recognized certification tests, the Novell
Certified Netware Administrator (CNA) exam and the A+ computer service
certificate test." Id. at 470-71.
168.
169.
170.

See id. at 471.
See id.
See id.
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educational malpractice and were contrary to public policy. 71 In addition,
the district court held that the Consumer Fraud Act and Deceptive Trade
Practices Act do not apply to educational services.'72

B.

The Court'sAnalysis

In reviewing this case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the
173
validity of educational malpractice claims in Minnesota for the first time.
The court acknowledged that the weight of authority in the country
rejects complaints regarding the general quality of education that students
receive.' 74
The court adhered to this general distaste for educational
75
malpractice claims. However, consistent with law in other jurisdictions
and prior precedent in Minnesota,' 76 the court held,
[A] student may bring an action against an educational
institution for breach of contract, fraud, or misrepresentation, if
it is alleged that the institution failed to perform on specific
promises it made to the student and the claim "would not
involve an inquiry into the nuances of educational processes
and theories. " 7
Applying

the

new rule,

the

court declared

some

claims

as

171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 472.
174. See id. The court pointed out the various public policy problems with
educational malpractice. See id. These problems include:
(1) the lack of a satisfactory standard of care by which to evaluate an
educator; (2) the inherent uncertainties about causation and the nature
of damages in light of such intervening factors as a student's attitude,
motivation, temperament, past experience, and home environment; (3)
the potential for a flood of litigation against schools; and (4) the
possibility that such claims will "embroil the courts into overseeing the
day-to-day operations of schools."
Id. (quoting Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992)).
175. See Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 400 (Colo. 1994); Squires by
Squires v. Sierra Nev. Educ. Found. Inc., 823 P.2d 256, 258 (Nev. 1991); Ryan v.
University of N.C. Hosps., 494 S.E.2d 789, 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Malone v.
Academy of Ct. Reporting, 582 N.E.2d 54, 56, 58-59 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
176. See generally Vilett v. Moler, 82 Minn. 12, 14-17, 84 N.W. 452, 453-54
(1900) (permitting issues of fraudulent inducement by a barber school to be
submitted to the jury).
177. Alsides, 592 N.W.2d at 473 (citing Ryan, 494 S.E.2d at 791).
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impermissible educational malpractice claims and upheld others as valid
actions for breach of contract, fraud or misrepresentation.178 In addition,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that
the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Practices Act and the Minnesota Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act may apply to educational services.' 79
VI. ANALYSIS
This analysis will discuss the trend in Minnesota law established by
Zellman and Alsides, analyze whether the case holdings follow precedent
established in Minnesota and federal courts, and discuss the policy
implications of the decisions and how the decisions may affect education
in the state.
A.

Trends Established in Minnesota Law

On its face, Zeliman establishes judicial support for school officials'
decisions.'w The Zellman court denied the plaintiff a contractual right
against the school.'. and held that the plaintiff had no property or liberty
interest violated in receiving a zero grade. 82 The court also decided that
even if the plaintiff did have an implicated property right, he received due
process. 183
The plaintiff and his parents did not legally succeed, but they
effectively succeeded: The principal, school board and Minnesota Court
of Appeals reviewed the grade. 84 This result sends an underlying message
that even if a school official takes relatively mild disciplinary measures for
egregious student misconduct, students and parents can waste school and
judicial officials' time and money. It is not a stretch to conclude that
teachers and administrators either will be inclined or forced to succumb
to student/parent complaints in order to avoid the inevitable waste of
resources.
Alsides likewise established a judicial trend for court abstention from
inspecting educational institutions, 85 permitting educational malpractice

178.
179.
180.
(Minn.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See id. at 473-74.
See id. at 474-76.
See Zellman v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 2758, 594 N.W.2d 216, 220
Ct. App. 1999).
See id. at 219-20.
See id. at 220.
See id. at 221.
See id. 219.
See Alsides, 592 N.W.2d at 473-74.
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186

claims only in certain circumstances.
Together, the cases generally
provide that courts will not intervene with operations and decisions of
educational institutions absent egregious circumstances.
B.

Relationship toJudicialPrecedent
1.

Discipline

In deciding the plaintiff's breach of contract claim in Zeliman, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that no enforceable contract existed
between the plaintiff and the school.1 7 This outcome is fairly common for
contractual analysis of public school students' cases.'
Likewise, with
respect to the due process analysis, the court's holding that plaintiff did
not have a property or liberty interest infringed upon by receiving a
failing grade parallels federal court decisions.n For example, in Zehner v.
CentralBerkshire Regional School District,'9° the court held that the use of the
school parking lot was not significant and not a property right requiring
due process protections. 91' Zehner further held that participation in
interscholastic athletics does not amount to a constitutionally protected
property interest.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals also determined that a grade did
not implicate a liberty interest because there was no tangible injury, only
speculative damage to the plaintiffs reputation. 93 In deciding Goss the
U.S. Supreme Court held that suspension for ten days or longer could
seriously damage a student's reputation and thus implicate a liberty
interest.9 4 Arguably, a zero grade on a single project is much less serious
than a ten-day suspension or even a one-day suspension. Thus, this

186. See id.
187. See Zellman, 594 N.W.2d at 219-20.
188. See Schweitzer, supra note 45, at 277 ("Compulsory education laws make
public school enrollment a legal right for those of the appropriate age" and
therefore, the voluntary acceptance of enrollment found in higher education is
lacking, and no enforceable contract is formed).
189. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
190. 921 F. Supp. 850 (D. Mass. 1995).
191. See id. at 862.
192. See id. (explaining that this holding would apply even where a student
claimed "an interest in a future professional athletic career"); see also Seamons v.
Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that participation in a school's
athletic program is not a constitutionally-protected property interest); Albach v.
Odle, 531 F.2d 983, 985 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that participation in athletics
and membership in school clubs are not protected property interests).
193. See Zellman, 594 N.W.2d at 220.
194. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975).
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portion of the Zellman court's decision comports with precedent.
Finally, the Zellman court determined that even if the plaintiff had a
protected property or liberty interest in his grade, the school provided
sufficient due process.195 Due process merely requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard, which the plaintiff received.'9
Certainly the
numerous hearings provided by the principal and school board exceeded
cases.9
the acceptable opportunity to be heard present in previous

2.

EducationalMalpractice

Minnesota courts have not previously addressed educational
malpractice claims. 98 The Alsides decision, however, corresponded with
the great weight of authority in this country.' 9 That is, a significant
majority of jurisdictions reject general educational malpractice claims on
public policy grounds."
In addition, although many courts may not
expressly state the fact, most courts leave room for valid claims involving

195. See Zeilman, 594 N.W.2d at 221.
196. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 584 (requiring "at least an informal give-and-take
between student and disciplinarian" and providing the student with "the
opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper
context"); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.
1961) (requiring that the student be given "the names of the witnesses against him
and an oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testifies" and "the
opportunity to present to the Board, or at least an administrative official of the
college, his own defense against the charges and to produce either oral testimony
or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf); Zehner v. Central Berkshire Reg'I
Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 850, 860 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that the student's
meeting with the school principal and his mother where the student was informed
of his violations and given a chance to respond, was sufficient due process).
198. In fact, the only precedent the Aisides court relied upon was a 1900 case,
Vilett v. Moler, 82 Minn. 12, 84 N.W. 452 (1900). In Vilett, the court permitted the
plaintiff to bring charges of fraudulent misrepresentation against the defendant
barber school. See id. at 17, 84 N.W. at 454.
199. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 415 (10th Cir.
1992) (refusing to "recognize the tort of educational malpractice"); Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (stating
that the consequences of exposing schools to tort claims would burden society
beyond calculation); Cencor, Inc. v. Tolman, 868 P.2d 396, 398 (Colo. 1994)
(affirming that educational malpractice claims are not recognized in the
jurisdiction); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 135455 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that educational malpractice claims would require the
court to blatantly interfere with the school district's constitutional
responsibilities); Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(extending the policy of non-judicial interference in educational malpractice
claims to contract actions against private educational institutions).
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school officials' more severe conduct.20' The court in Alsides explicitly
provides an exception to the general rule rejecting educational
malpractice claims.20

C.

Policy Implications

The policy implications of the Zellman and Alsides decisions are fivefold. First, the decisions support the theory that, absent egregious
circumstances, courts must abstain from reviewing decisions of
professional educators and education officials.
Such abstention is
necessary to ensure effective class planning, control and learning. This is
especially true in primary and secondary schools. In these circumstances,
where students are younger and receive a "free" education, discipline and
guidance are essential to ensure that each individual in the classroom
receives the best quality of instruction.
Judicial intervention affects schools and learning in several ways.
Intervention may cause educators to make teaching decisions that, in
ordinary circumstances and according to their level of instructing skill and
knowledge, they would not have made. Judicial intervention also may
inhibit disciplinary measures in school.
This in turn has several
ramifications. First, it promotes negative character traits in children. On
a more serious level, "[i]ncidents of violence and disorderly conductshootings, profanity and plain failure to obey rules-are escalating." 2 On
a different level, lack of discipline creates children who are rude,
irresponsible and ill-behaved.n 4 At least one commentator goes further,
stating that the lack of disciplinary measures has caused deculturalization,
"allowing an erosion of tradition and sensible expectations over time."05
201.

See, e.g., Ross, 957 F.2d at 416-17 (permitting breach of contract claims

against an educational institution if the plaintiff can identify a specific contractual

promise which the defendant failed to fulfill); Cencor, 868 P.2d at 399
(distinguishing claims where educational institutions allegedly "failed to provide
specifically promised educational services, such as a failure to offer any classes or a
failure to deliver a promised number of hours of instruction"); Donohue, 391
N.E.2d at 1354 (limiting its holding with the statement "[this] is not to say that
there may never be gross violations of defined public policy which the courts
would be obliged to recognize and correct."); Andre, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 779 (stating
that the court may permit claims "sounding in 'educational malpractice"' if they

are sufficient under traditional tort law).
202.

See Alsides v. Brown Inst., Ltd., 592 N.W.2d 468, 473-74 (Minn. Ct. App.

1999) (explaining that valid causes of action may arise for breach of contract,
fraud or misrepresentation).
203. Wright, supra note 1, at 23.
204. See id. at 25.

205. See Wallis, supra note 1, at 32 (advocating moral instruction in schools, as
well as intellectual or educational instruction).
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When a court imposes liability on a school for taking disciplinary
measures, the result is worse. School children, aware of their legal rights,
use the judiciary as a threat to obtain immunity from school rules and
regulations.2w
The second policy implication is that failure to discipline one or two
students disrupts the learning of other students in the classroom.0 7 One
teacher confirms that "[w]e're letting a few ruin it for the majority of kids
who are eager to learn. "208
Third, lack of discipline may encourage an environment where
students continually aggravate other students.2°9 For example, a sixthgrade girl in San Francisco endured months of sexual harassment from a
classmate. 2'0 The school failed to take action
against the classmate for fear
21
of legal action by the boy and his parents. '
Fourth, the lack of permissible disciplinary measures may cause good
teachers to resign. 212 One frustrated instructor who resigned from
teaching stated, "This was chaos .... I wasn't teaching. I was just coping
and making sure these kids got through the day alive." 21 3 Officials and
administrators fearful of legal claims may fail to support their teachers. As
a result, when teachers have neither administrative
nor parental support,
21 4
they become "isolated and frustrated."
Fifth, lack of discipline supports the criticized "self-esteem"
movement. This is a fairly recent educational theory with a primary
purpose of building self-esteem in young students. 21 5 Educational
commentators criticize this theory as sacrificing real education 216 and as
promoting an unrealistic view of life. 17 For example, if a teacher
206. See Wright, supranote 1, at 25.
207. SeeVarer, supra note 1, at 18; Wright, supra note 1, at 23.
208. Wright, supra note 1, at 23.
209. See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
210. See Carlson, supra note 1, at 27.
211. See id. Instead, the school lost $500,000 in a suit brought by the girl and
her parents. See id.
212. See Wright, supra note 1, at 23.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 24.
215. See Wallis, supra note 1, at 33; Wright, supra note 1, at 25; 20/20, supra
note 1.
216. See 20/20, supra note 1 (noting that although kids felt good about
themselves, they were not learning).
217. See, e.g., Wallis, supra note 1, at 33; 20/20, supra note 1. An instructor
should never tell a student that she is brilliant. See 20/20, supra note 1. Doing so
gets the student "caught up in being brilliant, rather than learning." Id. Rather,
students should receive honest feedback and should be taught that success results
from effort. See id. If instructors protect students from their weaknesses and
failures, the students will never be able to improve upon those weaknesses. See id.
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promotes a student's self-worth when such praise is undeserved, the
student may be unable to cope with life's disappointments later.2 18 That
student will not have learned the value of perseverance, hard work,
honesty and responsibility in obtaining success. 9 In addition, the selfesteem movement harms a student's performance because if he or she is
praised for performing an easy task, he or she will not want to perform
Finally, inflating students' self-esteem may actually
harder tasks.2 2
increase violent behavior among the students.ul "People who have this
inflated, grandiose view of themselves, when other people criticize them,
Conceited
they're likely to lash out and become angry and aggressive....
m
people get nasty when you burst their bubble of self-love."
Although different from disciplinary cases, the policy implications of
educational malpractice claims are similar. That is, judicial support
whenever a student is dissatisfied with an aspect of her education hinders
educators' instruction and decisions. Educators may be forced to make
decisions that are risk-adverse rather than decisions based upon their
professional instinct, knowledge, and skill. As a result, students fail to
receive a quality education. Students and society lose in the end.
Perhaps with colleges and universities, where students attend
voluntarily and usually pay to attend, students should have a greater say in
their education. There must be a limit, however, to this say as well. Even
these students will not receive proper education and guidance at the
hands of skilled professionals if legal claims and judicial reprimands
inhibit professionals' sound judgment. Nor will educational institutions
survive monetarily if subjected to repeated legal claims.n2
While Zellman and Alsides explicitly support these educational
218. See Wallis, supra note 1, at 33; 20/20, supranote 1.
219. See Wallis, supra note 1, at 33.
220. See 20/20, supranote 1. For example, a psychology professor named Carol
Dweck from Columbia University performed a test on fifth-graders. See id. She
gave one group an easy puzzle to solve, later telling them how smart they were. See
id. A second group was given the puzzle, and later told not that they were smart,
but that they tried hard. See id. Next, both groups were given a much harder test
in which everyone did poorly. See id. Then the groups were asked to take more
tests. See id. The second group of students who were praised for their effort were
eager to take more tests. See id. The first group of students who were told they
were smart "were reluctant to face further challenges." Id.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ("[Educational institutions] are already beset by social and
financial problems which have gone to major litigation, but for which no
permanent solution has yet appeared ....

The ultimate consequences, in terms of

public time and money, would burden them-and society-beyond calculation.").
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theories, the extensive process endured by the schools inherently supports
the students' claims. That is, both schools were forced to sacrifice
significant time and resources in defending the students' claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this country, parents, students, and school officials are frustrated
with the lack of student discipline. Many commentators are calling for an
end to the so-called student rights movement in which students can
threaten legal action to obtain anything they want from schools. 4 The
lack of discipline and decision-making by educators results in children
who are ill-behaved and disrespectful of others. 5 It inhibits the ability of
educators to effectively instruct students who are willing to learn.n6 The
lack of discipline also hampers educators in carrying out their professional
duties and forces educators to act as babysitters.227
In order to reinstate discipline, order and learning in the classroom,
teachers must be able to make and enforce policies and rules according to
their professional judgment. For successful rule making and enforcing,
school administration must support teachers' decisions. The legal system
plays a pivotal role in this chain of events. It must support the policies
and decisions of school administration. Without this support, disgruntled
students and parents can overcome decisions of school administrators,
undermining educators and disrupting policies.
The Minnesota Court of Appeal's decisions in Zellman and Alsides
carried out this pivotal role by largely rejecting student claims, except in
egregious circumstances.
It is essential to successful learning that
judiciaries in other jurisdictions follow suit.

224.
225.
226.
227.

See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1; Wallis, supranote 1; Wright, supra note 1.
See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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